While there is ample evidence that children treat words as mutually exclusive, the cognitive basis of this bias is widely debated. We focus on the distinction between pragmatic and lexical constraints accounts. High-functioning children with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) offer a unique perspective on this debate, as they acquire substantial vocabularies despite impoverished social-pragmatic skills. We tested children and adolescents with ASD in a paradigm examining mutual exclusivity for words and facts. Words were interpreted contrastively more often than facts. Word performance was associated with vocabulary size; fact performance was associated with social-communication skills. Thus mutual exclusivity does not appear to be driven by pragmatics, suggesting that it is either a lexical constraint or a reflection of domain-general learning processes.
Introduction
In Categorization and Naming in Children (1989) , Ellen Markman presented a set of questions and phenomena that have fueled research on word learning for 20 years. Early cognitive accounts of language acquisition focused primarily on syntax (see the papers in Slobin (1985) for examples and Clark (1973) for a discussion), perhaps because many theorists assumed that word learning could be explained by simple associations between word forms and referents. This assumption was challenged by researchers who pointed out that the midcentury philosophical critiques of empiricism (Goodman, 1966; Quine, 1960) were transparently applicable to the problem of lexical acquisition; that is, the input itself can never logically disambiguate the meaning of a word (see e.g., Landau, Smith, & Jones, 1988; Macnamara, 1982; Markman & Hutchinson, 1984) . The experiments that followed demonstrated that young children do not learn words through brute force associative learning; instead they approach the task with a set of constraints that help guide them to the correct meaning, minimizing the need for extensive observation. For example, children preferentially map labels to whole objects, rather than their parts or other qualities, and they extend these labels to other members of the same taxonomic category, rather than to thematically-associated objects (Markman, 1990; Markman & Hutchinson, 1984) . In the case of novel artifacts, these taxonomic categories are typically inferred on the basis of the object's shape or function, rather than its color, texture, or location (Kemler Nelson, Frankenfield, Morris, & Blaire, 2000; Landau et al., 1988) .
The discovery of these constraints on word learning immediately raised questions about their origins and their scope. Are these particular constraints present at the onset of word learning or do they emerge as the product of prior word learning (see e.g., Smith, 1999; Smith, Jones, Landau, Gershkoff-Stowe, & Samuelson, 2002) ? Are these constraints specific to word learning or are they side effects 0010-0277/$ -see front matter Ó 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2010.12.011
